今次爭論重點是暴力的程度(註一)，香港上訴庭法官引用了英國反戰案例和“賀輔明勳爵評論「公民抗命」這個概念”。這是引喻失義，因為英國的案例是上訴判罪 (conviction) ，而香港的13人案是上訴量刑( sentence )，法官的考慮完全不同。
在2003年的英國反戰示威中，20名反戰份子剪破海軍基地鐵絲網(cut a hole in the perimeter
wire and entered the port through it.)，將自己上鎖，倒沙糖到油箱進行破壞 (putting
sugar into the petrol tanks of lorries ) ，甚至到費爾福德空軍基地準備燒美軍飛機 (intended
to use to destroy or damage such aircraft. ) (註二)。在英國，示威者被輕判 (The conditional discharges ordered by the magistrates in the cases
which came before them exemplifies their sensitivity to these conventions ) (註3)，上訴庭法官又唔講，說明他們 “講D唔講D”。
香港上訴庭法官討論了“G2. 判刑時如何考慮「公民抗命」這個犯案的動機”。但他們實質上沒有解釋這一概念。他們所說的“賀輔明勳爵頗嚴厲地批評了這樣的做法”是監人勑厚(註4)。
現在看一看R v. Jones 案判詞第90至92段吧。第90段指英國的反核、反動物實驗、反獵狐、反基因食物等的公民運動興起，這是一平鋪直敘的一段，不引起爭議(註5)。
第91段解釋了上訴庭為何維持原判。案主打破了奧爾德馬斯頓的一度閘門，其理由是要制止那裡生產核彈。原判的理由是沒有即時的自衛需要 ("There was no immediate and instant need to act as Mrs
Hutchinson acted,)，尤其是使用暴力的自衛 (particularly criminal
self-help ) (註6)。
賀輔明勳爵在第92段判詞(註7)中解釋了他為何維持原判。這是因為，案主的辯駁拙劣 (即時性)(this assertion on her part is further
fatal to her cause )，因此賀輔明勳爵完全找不到信服理由( I simply do not see how
it can be reasonable ) 。
我們從這3段看不到賀輔明勳爵的“頗嚴厲的批評”和香港法官的擔心暴力衝突，應該以入獄是量刑起點等等。因而，香港三位上訴庭法官是有意地偷換概念。
石永泰指戴耀庭 “講D唔講D”，可是上訴庭三位法官同樣地“講D唔講D”，他們越是這樣，越引起人們批評法治。
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備註
註一
六) 涉及暴力之非法集結的相關情節
98. 法庭在決定適當的刑罰時，需要考慮干犯涉案罪行的相關情節。就牽涉暴力的非法集結，有關干犯罪行的情節包括：
(1) 暴力行為是即場突然發生，還是有預先計劃的，若是後者，計劃周詳及精密的程度為何；
(2) 施行暴力者人數多少；
(3) 使用暴力的程度，包括有否使用武器，若有的話，是甚麼武器和數量；
(4) 使用暴力的規模，包括發生暴力的所在之處、地點數目及範圍；
(5) 暴力行為維時多久，包括暴力行為有否拖長；經警方或其他公職人員重複警告後，是否仍然進行；
(6) 暴力行為所引致的後果：例如有否對財物造成任何損失或破壞，若有的話，其程度為何；是否有人受傷，若有的話，傷者人數及傷勢為何；
(7) 即使沒有財物損失或破壞，也沒有人受傷，但暴力行為造成的威脅之嚴重性及逼近程度為何；
(8) 犯案者的角色及參與程度，如除自己有參與非法集結或使用暴力外，有否安排、帶領、號召、煽動或鼓吹他人參與非法集結或使用暴力。
視乎實際情況，任何案件都可能有其他需要考慮的罪行情節
(八) 適用於涉及暴力之非法集結的判刑原則
106. 法庭對涉及暴力之非法集結所採用的判刑原則可總結如下：
(一) 按照一般的判刑原則，法庭會全面考慮案件的實際情況和罪行情節的嚴重性，繼而就每個適用的判刑元素給予應有的比重，然後對犯案者處以與案件相稱的判刑。同樣的原則適用於涉及暴力的非法集結。
(二) 《公安條例》第18條對非法集結的定義雖然頗為簡單，但所涵蓋的案情可以很廣泛，犯罪情節的嚴重性也會因案情而有別，其幅度也很大，由一端極輕微的到另一端極其嚴重的都有，視乎實際情況而定。涉及暴力的非法集結當然是較接近情節嚴重那一端的罪行，可是涉及暴力之非法集結的案情也會是多式多樣，所以即使是屬於較嚴重的罪行，其實際犯罪情節的嚴重性也會有所不同，也有其幅度；在這幅度上，法庭會按照案情實際情況和罪行情節的嚴重性，而對適用的判刑元素給予該有的比重。
(三) 在維持公共秩序的大前提下，並顧及到非法集結的控罪要旨，法庭在判刑時需要考慮阻嚇這個判刑元素，至於該給予多大的比重則需視乎案件實際情況而定。
(四) 若是案情相對地輕微，例如，非法集結並非預謀，規模極小、只涉及十分輕微的暴力、沒有造成任何人身傷害或財產破壞，法庭給予犯案者個人的情況、犯案動機或原因、和更生這個判刑元素的比重可以相稱地增加[43]，而阻嚇這個判刑元素的比重可以相稱地減少。
(五) 若是案情嚴重的，例如涉及暴力的非法集結規模大，或是涉及嚴重暴力，法庭會給予懲罰和阻嚇這兩個判刑元素很大的比重，而給予犯案者個人的情況、犯案動機或原因、和更生這個判刑元素很少的比重，或者在極端的情況下，甚至不給予任何比重。
(六) 當法庭對所有適用的判刑元素給予其該有的比重後，便可以對犯案者處以和案件相稱的判刑。
107. 一般而言，就案情輕微的罪行，雖然犯罪情節不是那麼嚴重，但法庭仍要確保公共秩序得到有效維護，所以判刑仍需要具備相稱的阻嚇力。由此考慮，若案情合適，社會服務令可以是恰當的判刑選項，因為社會服務令包含的懲罰元素，可以視為具相稱的阻嚇力，而其更生的元素也可以幫助犯案者，特別是年輕的犯案者更生。
108. 至於案情嚴重的罪行，刑罰的主要目的是為懲罰犯罪者及阻嚇罪行，法庭整體的考慮定當傾向判處即時囚禁的刑罰。除非存在罕見的非常特殊情況，否則其他非即時囚禁的刑罰，包括緩刑和社會服務令並不適合。
註二
Judgments - R v.
Jones (Appellant) (On Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division))
(formerly R v. J (Appellant)), Etc.
HOUSE OF LORDS
SESSION 2005-06 [2006] UKHL 16
2.
There are 20 appellants before the House. All of them committed acts in
February or March 2003 which were, or are alleged to have been, criminal
offences, unless there was legal justification for what they did or are said to
have done
3. On
the night of 13 March 2003 the appellants Margaret Jones and Paul Milling broke
into the Royal Air Force base at Fairford in Gloucestershire and caused damage
to fuel tankers and bomb trailers. They had conspired together to do so. A
little later, the appellants Toby Olditch and Philip Pritchard conspired
together to cause criminal damage at the base. On 18 March 2003 they had in
their possession articles which they intended to use to destroy or damage the
runway at the base and aircraft belonging to the United States Air Force. On
the same date, 18 March 2003, the appellant Josh Richards attempted to set fire
to an aircraft at the base belonging to the United States Air Force. He had
with him on that date articles which he intended to use to destroy or damage
such aircraft. Also on that date, he caused damage to a perimeter fence at the
base. It is convenient to refer to these appellants collectively as "the
Fairford appellants".
On 4 February
2003, some weeks before hostilities began against Iraq, they trespassed on the
land of the Sea Mounting Centre, Marchwood Military Port, at Hythe in
Hampshire. Some of them entered the port by boat. Others cut a hole in the
perimeter wire and entered the port through it. Some of them chained themselves
to tanks or reconnaissance vehicles. The work of the port, which involved the
loading of vessels bound for the Middle East, was brought to a halt, as they
intended. They were all charged with the offence of aggravated trespass
contrary to section 68(1) of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994,
On 9 March 2003
the appellant Valerie Swain and others trespassed on the RAF base at Fairford
which she entered by cutting a hole in the perimeter fence. She intended to
obstruct or disrupt the maintenance of the security of the base. She (with nine
others) was charged with aggravated trespass contrary to section 68(1) of the
1994 Act
chaining oneself
to railings or putting sugar into the petrol tanks of lorries involves the use
of force for the purposes of section 3 of the 1967 Act.
註三
This can apply
even if a defendant has a prior conviction in similar circumstances involving
acts of conscience, although convictions for other offences can also become an
aggravating factor. Thus, the few anti-fracking protesters arrested at Barton
Moss in Salford and later convicted all received conditional discharges and
small fines. Similarly, most defendants convicted over protests at Ellesmere
Port have been conditionally discharged and fined but in April 2015, one
received a prison sentence because of an extensive criminal record for robbery
and violence.
District Judges
are usually aware of Lord Hoffman’s remarks, but lay justices (and their
clerks) are often not. It is important that advocates – and especially
defendants representing themselves – draw the court’s attention to this passage
on acting on grounds of conscience, which is in paragraph 89, R v Jones [2006]
UKHL16.
89.
My Lords, civil disobedience on conscientious grounds has a long and
honourable history in this country. People who break the law to affirm their
belief in the injustice of a law or government action are sometimes vindicated
by history. The suffragettes are an example which comes immediately to mind. It
is the mark of a civilised community that it can accommodate protests and
demonstrations of this kind. But there are conventions which are generally
accepted by the law-breakers on one side and the law-enforcers on the other.
The protesters behave with a sense of proportion and do not cause excessive
damage or inconvenience. And they vouch the sincerity of their beliefs by
accepting the penalties imposed by the law. The police and prosecutors, on the
other hand, behave with restraint and the magistrates impose sentences which
take the conscientious motives of the protesters into account. The
conditional discharges ordered by the magistrates in the cases which came
before them exemplifies their sensitivity to these conventions.
註四
G2. 判刑時如何考慮「公民抗命」這個犯案的動機
116. 如上文指出，以「公民抗命」為犯案動機的人，通常會認罪並接受刑罰來表達他們對其信念的真摯；但這並不是必然的。在Jones案，賀輔明勳爵在其判詞第90至92段便指出，當時在英國有一個趨勢，以「公民抗命」為辯解的抗爭者選擇不認罪，意圖用刑事檢控法律程序作為繼續抗爭的手法，務求法庭對他們的意見或訴求的是非曲直作出裁斷，或把法庭變成一個平台，讓他們就相關的議題向媒體發聲。賀輔明勳爵頗嚴厲地批評了這樣的做法，並指出此做法是不對的。
註五
90.
These appeals and similar cases concerned with controversial activities
such as animal experiments, fox hunting, genetically modified crops, nuclear
weapons and the like, suggest the emergence of a new phenomenon, namely
litigation as the continuation of protest by other means. (See, for examples, R
v Hill (1988) 89 Cr App R 74 (nuclear weapons) Blake v Director of Public
Prosecutions [1993] Crim LR 586 (Gulf War) Morrow, Geach and Thomas v Director
of Public Prosecutions [1994] Crim LR 58 (anti-abortion) Hibberd v Director of
Public Prosecutions (27 November 1996) Divisional Court, unreported (Newbury
by-pass) Hutchinson v Newbury Magistrates' Court (2000) 122 ILR 499 (Trident
missiles) Nelder v Crown Prosecution Service (3 June 1998) Divisional Court,
unreported (fox hunting) Lord Advocate's Reference No 1 of 2000 2001 JC 143
(Trident missiles) Director of Public Prosecutions v Tilly [2002] Crim LR 128
(genetically modified crops) Monsanto v Tilly [2000] Env LR 313 (genetically
modified crops).) The protesters claim that their honestly held opinion of the
legality or dangerous character of the activities in question justifies
trespass, causing damage to property or the use of force. By this means they
invite the court to adjudicate upon the merits of their opinions and provide
themselves with a platform from which to address the media on the subject. They
seek to cause expense and, if possible, embarrassment to the prosecution by
exorbitant demands for disclosure, such as happened in this case.
註六
91.
In Hutchinson v Newbury Magistrates' Court (2000) 122 ILR 499, where a
protester sought to justify causing damage to a fence at Aldermaston on the
ground that she was trying to halt the production of nuclear warheads, Buxton
LJ said: "There was no immediate and instant need to act as Mrs Hutchinson
acted, either [at] the time when she acted or at all: taking into account that
there are other means available to her of pursuing the end sought, by drawing
attention to the unlawfulness of the activities and if needs be taking legal
action in respect of them. In those circumstances, self-help, particularly
criminal self-help of the sort indulged in by Mrs Hutchinson, cannot be
reasonable."
註七
92.
I respectfully agree. The judge then went on to deal with Mrs
Hutchinson's real motive, which ("on express instructions") her
counsel had frankly avowed. It was to "bring the issue of the lawfulness
of the government's policy before a court, preferably a Crown Court."
Buxton LJ said: "In terms of the reasonableness of Mrs Hutchinson's acts,
this assertion on her part is further fatal to her cause. I simply do not see
how it can be reasonable to commit a crime in order to be able to pursue in the
subsequent prosecution, arguments about the lawfulness or otherwise of the
activities of the victim of that crime."
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