要回答上述問題，方法是驗證昂山素姬是背離她的認知？緬甸政府自已的《顧問委員會最後報告》就是這一工具，它受到其軍方接納，而昂山素姬的認識不可能嚴重脫離這一報告。
以下就是報告承認的事實：
地區
發生今次人道災難的若開邦本身是一個較遠離集體統治的地方(has for most of its history been a distinct political entity )(註1)，憲法賦予軍方自治權力(high degree of autonomy for
the military part of the government)(註二)。雖然這個委員會是中央授權的，但地方政府杯葛了它(leading to an official boycott by some Rakhine stakeholders
(including the parliament,)(註三)。報告也指出限制當地人自由流通，導致廣泛的貪污腐敗 (take bribes in return for
travel permits) (註3.1)。
當地政府軍
緬甸地區的政府軍貪贓枉法 (security
forces are often accused of being corrupt )(註3.2) 。更有甚者，被安排到管理羅興亞人的政府軍是不慬羅興亞語的
(should be offered language training ) (註3.3)。今次迫害的主催者可能是地區力量，而非中央的主意。
受迫害者
委員會的授命是了解若開邦的問題，而不是單單了解羅興族人的問題(analyse the present situation of all communities in Rakhine State,)(註四)，但報告在各範疇中看到的受害者都是羅興族人，而且是大規模的。
Muslims in Rakhine constitute the single biggest stateless community
in the world.。(註五)
社會迫害
它包括工作迫害(avoid hiring
Muslims ) (註七)；新生嬰兒而不得身份權利，不單違反國際標準，也為緬甸內部法不容(child would otherwise be stateless
-- contradict recent laws - ) (註八)；12萬羅興亞人被送到集中營，被褫奪公權(affect basic rights and
many aspects of their daily lives)(註九)；被社會排擠( While Muslims resent continued exclusion )(註十)；
人道罪行
盡管委員會的主要功能不是人道調查(does
not investigate specific cases of alleged human rights abuses.)(註六)，它無可避免地觸及這一方面。它指出地區政府軍犯上嚴重人道罪行，必須交代 (serious
human rights violations by the security forces--- release the full report as
soon as possible - ) (註十一)。
時間序
若開邦的種族磨擦由來已久，但今次人道災難的前因是2012年的兩教仇殺(most Muslims were forced to leave )(註12)。地區關係本來已趨平靜，2016年的一次反政府武裝襲擊政府邊防軍觸發今天事件(註13)。
反政府武裝
報告分析了各個反政府武裝(註14)，它們的政治立場似乎較模糊。最清楚的是戰後早期的爭取族民權利 ( demanding
equal rights and an autonomous )，而非獨立。
2016年襲擊是歷來最嚴重的一次( largest Muslim attacks on
Government forces in living memory. )，不過也只是造成69名反政府武裝份子和17名政府軍死亡，可見若開邦的反政府武裝力量有限。
由此看來，它們屬於官迫民反，以報復性質為主。 但報復性質的應是寃有頭債有主。報告已表明，大部份羅興亞人從2012年始已被送進76所集中營(聯合國2013年資料)，主要的對立發生在集中營 (Camp Management Committees, which themselves
are frequently accused of corruption.) (註15)，它們為什麼攻擊遠在邊防的政府軍呢？
應否各打50大板
一份華文文章在這份事上受到不少關注，其意見為『翁山蘇姬沒有辦法力挺羅興亞人，因為這樣長遠的歷史仇恨』(註16)。
現在，看一看緬甸人如何看今次事件吧。緬甸人已解說，今次事件不是攻擊當地人，與2012年的完全不同，有力地反駁了各打50的觀點。事情根本上不是東方還是西方價值觀的問題。
結論
昂山素姬有份調查，最後報告的意見不可能與她的意見相左。這就是說，她清楚知道，若開邦的羅興亞人是問題核心，她不應該在公開聲明中隻字不提羅興亞人！
報告譴責了侵犯人權的事實，她不可能不對此公開譴責！
報告已表明今次事件主因不是當地人(佛教徒)不滿羅興亞人(穆斯林)，她不可能不為羅興亞人說公道話！
她清楚知道，最終報告的建議已經不可能落實，因為羅興亞人已被逐出若開邦，回國無期，而如何善待羅興亞人正是報告中近百個建議的主要對象。她不可能說建議正在落實中！
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備註
註一
Rakhine State –
separated from the rest of Myanmar by a rugged chain of mountains – has for
most of its history been a distinct political entity. While there are records
of independent kingdoms since antiquity, the final Rakhine kingdom was
established in 1430, with its capital in Mrauk U. Situated on the border
between Buddhist and Muslim Asia, the kingdom had strong economic, trade and
other relations with the Sultanate of Bengal. For the next 350 years, Mrauk U
thrived as a prosperous trading hub, until it came under Burmese control in
1784-85. The annexation of Rakhine was shortlived, as the First Anglo-Burmese
War (1824-1826) brought the area under British control and subsequent
incorporation into British India.
註二
Myanmar’s
governance structure – which, in line with the 2008 Constitution, provides for
a high degree of autonomy for the military part of the government – makes the
search for and implementation of a coherent and harmonized policy to the
complex problems of Rakhine State more challenging. During the course of its
work, the Commission has consulted the Commander-in- Chief and other senior
officers in the Tatmadaw, as well as those officers serving in ministerial line
functions that concern Rakhine State. Obviously, the support of the armed
forces is vital for the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations. All
arms of the governmental structure will need to work closely together in a
coordinated and cohesive manner to implement the Commission’s recommendations
註三
Some
stakeholders rejected the Commission from the very beginning, and in early
September 2016, a motion in the national parliament sought to abolish the
Commission. Although the motion eventually failed, it was supported by the
Arakan National Party (ANP), the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP)
and all military-appointed lawmakers. However, a similar motion in the Rakhine
State Parliament in mid-September was successful, leading to an official
boycott by some Rakhine stakeholders (including the parliament, ANP and parts
of civil society). Although the Commission has managed to meet most of these
actors anyhow, the sustained boycott has to some extent complicated the
Commission’s efforts to get buy-in from all communities in the state.
註3.1
Restrictions on
freedom of movement for the Muslim community, including the confinement of
approximately 120,000 people in IDP camps – most of whom rely entirely on
foreign aid – have particularly detrimental effects on the level of economic activity
in the state. Such restrictions have created prohibitive barriers for Muslim
businesses and labourers to enter the economy, and increased incentives for
engaging in illicit commercial activities. It has also nurtured a culture of
unproductive rent-seeking, as the complex matrix of restrictions enables
Government officials to take bribes in return for travel permits and commercial
licenses. This, however, does not only affect Muslims: For all communities in
Rakhine, acquiring government permissions is a costly and challenging
endeavour, often discouraging entrepreneurs from starting or expanding
businesses. They all have to deal with expensive licenses, inefficient
bureaucracies and corruption. Fear and insecurity also impede entrepreneurship.
註3.2
Public trust in
Myanmar’s security forces unfortunately remains low across the state. Both
within the Rakhine and Muslim community, the security forces are often accused
of being corrupt, and of failing to provide adequate protection in case of
violent upheavals, such as in 2012. In a survey, a significant number of
respondents from all communities in Rakhine identified the “lack of law
enforcement” as a major reason for the deteriorating security situation in the
state (rising from 24 percent in 2015 to 41 percent in 2016).
註3.3
Recommendations
70. Security
personnel assigned to Muslim majority areas in northern Rakhine State should be
offered language training in order to reduce misunderstandings and improve
relations with local communities. In the meantime, community liaison officers
should be appointed to act as interpreters.
註四
The mandate, structure and composition of the Rakhine
Advisory Commission
The Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, chaired by Mr KofiAnnan,
was established on 5 September 2016 at the behest of Myanmar’s State Counsellor
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. According to the Commission’s Terms of Reference – agreed
by the Government of Myanmar and the KofiAnnan Foundation – the Commission will
analyse the present situation of all communities in Rakhine State, and seek to
identify the factors that have resulted in violence, displacement and
underdevelopment. In doing so, the Commission will consider humanitarian
issues, living conditions, access to health, education and livelihoods, the
question of citizenship and freedom of movement, and the assurance of basic
rights. In accordance with established international standards, the Commission
was mandated to develop recommendations within five thematic areas: conflict
prevention, humanitarian assistance, reconciliation, institution building and
development. The Commission is composed of six national members (U Win Mra, U
Aye Lwin, Dr Tha Hla Shwe, Dr Mya Thida, Daw Saw Khin Tint and U Khin Maung
Lay) and three international members (Mr Ghassan Salamé, Ms Laetitia van den
Assum and Mr KofiAnnan). Although the Commission includes three international
commissioners, the Commission is essentially a national mechanism: It was
established by the Government of Myanmar, and reports to the national
authorities in Naypyitaw.
註五
Rakhine also
represents a human rights crisis. While all communities have suffered from
violence and abuse, protracted statelessness and profound discrimination have
made the Muslim community particularly vulnerable to human rights violations.
Some ten percent of the world’s stateless people live in Myanmar, and the
Muslims in Rakhine constitute the single biggest stateless community in the
world. The community faces a number of restrictions which affect basic rights
and many aspects of their daily lives. Approximately 120,000 people are still
left in camps for Internally Displaced People (IDPs). The community has been
denied political representation, and is generally excluded from Myanmar’s body
politic. Efforts by the Government to verify citizenship claims have failed to
win the confidence of either Muslim or Rakhine communities.
註六
In March 2017, a
resolution at the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva called for the
establishment of an international fact-finding mission to examine, inter alia,
allegations of human rights violations committed by Myanmar’s security forces
in Rakhine. The mission is scheduled to give an oral update to the Human Rights
Council in September 2017 and a final report in March 2018. The fact-finding
mission’s mandate differs from that of the Rakhine Advisory Commission, which
has a much broader mandate, and does not investigate specific cases of alleged
human rights abuses.
註七
Some Rakhine
employers have come under intense pressure from Rakhine nationalists to avoid
hiring Muslims, thus disrupting the labour market and depriving the community
of employment opportunities.
註八
1982 Citizenship Law 29
Changes in the
country over the past 35 years have highlighted some deficiencies in the
citizenship law, which currently create tension between communities, lead to
frustration for those who are not citizens, contradict recent laws, including
the 2008 constitution, and fall short of international standards, including
those which Myanmar has approved. The manner in which the law has been applied
over the past decades has not done justice to the credible claims of
communities who have been living in the country for generations. Of these the
Muslims in Rakhine state are the largest but certainly not the only group. The
developments described below show how, through a process of gradual
disenfranchisement, these Muslims gradually became marginalized and
particularly vulnerable.
“in accordance with
their national law and their obligations under the relevant international
instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be
stateless.”
註九
Rakhine also
represents a human rights crisis. While all communities have suffered from
violence and abuse, protracted statelessness and profound discrimination have
made the Muslim community particularly vulnerable to human rights violations.
Some ten percent of the world’s stateless people live in Myanmar, and the
Muslims in Rakhine constitute the single biggest stateless community in the
world. The community faces a number of restrictions which affect basic rights
and many aspects of their daily lives. Approximately 120,000 people are still
left in camps for Internally Displaced People (IDPs). The community has been
denied political representation, and is generally excluded from Myanmar’s body
politic. Efforts by the Government to verify citizenship claims have failed to
win the confidence of either Muslim or Rakhine communities.
註十
Finally, Rakhine
is also a security crisis. As witnessed by the Commission during its many
consultations across Rakhine State, all communities harbour deep-seated fears,
with the legacy of the violence of 2012 fresh in many minds. While Muslims
resent continued exclusion, the Rakhine community worry about becoming a
minority in the state in the future.
註十一
In the wake of
the fatal attack on the Border Guard Police on 9 October 2016 and the
subsequent military operations carried out in northern Rakhine State,
allegations have been made of serious human rights violations by the security
forces during these operations. In light of such allegations, the Commission
reiterates the recommendation in its interim report that the Government should
ensure – based on independent and impartial investigation – that perpetrators
of serious human rights violations are held accountable. The Commission noted
the establishment of the Investigation Commission on the events in Maungdaw,
and calls on the Government to release the full report as soon as possible.
註十二
In 1942-43,
during the chaotic circumstances of the Anglo-Japanese war, both communities
suffered from violence and widespread displacement. More recently, in June and
October 2012, the state was again marked by large-scale inter-communal
violence, during which at least 192 people were killed (134 Muslims and 58
Rakhines). While both communities were hit hard by the violence, destruction to
private property was highly asymmetric, as 7,422 out of 8,614 destroyed houses
(about 86 percent) belonged to Muslims.3 Moreover, more than 95 percent of the
approximately 140,000 IDPs generated by the conflict were Muslims, of which
around 120,000 still remain in squalid IDP camps. In several areas – including
the centre of Sittwe and Kyawkpyuh – most Muslims were forced to leave.
註十三
While military
operations were scaled down in the beginning of 2017 – leading many refugees
and IDPs to return – a significant risk of renewed violence remains. While the
first months after the 9 October attacks were characterized by a strongly
securitised response, the situation now urgently requires an integrated and
calibrated response - one that combines political, developmental, security and
human rights responses to ensure that violence does not escalate and
inter-communal tensions are kept under control. If human rights concerns are
not properly addressed – and if the population remain politically and
economically marginalized – northern Rakhine State may provide fertile ground
for radicalization, as local communities may become increasingly vulnerable to
recruitment by extremists. If not addressed properly, this may not only
undermine prospects for development and inter-communal cohesion, but also the
overall security of the state.
註14
At different
times – and with varying intensity – both Rakhines and Muslims have sought to
advance their political agendas through armed struggle against the central
government. Shortly after Myanmar’s independence in 1948, a Muslim “mujahidin”
rebellion erupted in Rakhine, demanding equal rights and an autonomous Muslim
area in the north of the state. While the rebellion was eventually defeated,
the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) revived the armed struggle in the
1980s, but lost its military potency in the late 1990s. When Harakat al-Yakin
(later Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA)) attacked Government security
forces on 9 October 2016, it was one of the largest Muslim attacks on
Government forces in living memory. On the Rakhine side, non-state armed groups
of both nationalist and communist stripes have fought the Myanmar Army since
independence. Today, the strongest Rakhine insurgency movement is the Arakan
Army (AA), which was founded in Kachin in 2009, and which gradually has
expanded its presence and operational capabilities in Rakhine. Over the past
years, dozens of Myanmar security personnel have reportedly been killed by AA.
註15
To mitigate the
lack of a fair and well-functioning judiciary, the overwhelming majority of
disputes are currently handled through local and informal mechanisms –
typically involving community leaders, local administrators and religious
leaders. In IDP camps, dispute resolution often involves representatives of the
Camp Management Committees, which themselves are frequently accused of
corruption. Within all communities, public understanding of the law is
negligible because successive governments have generally failed to educate
local communities about their rights. While most government officials seem to
want to increase legal awareness, there are many obstacles – including a lack
of capacity and funding.
註16
當國際撻伐羅興亞人的不公平待遇，其實應聽聽「緬甸人怎麼說」
翁山蘇姬沒有辦法力挺羅興亞人，因為這樣長遠的歷史仇恨，全民盟剛取得政權不久，緬甸目前仍有四成的領土是由地方割據政權控制，如果就照著西方國家的步調前進，反而會激起緬甸人民的不滿
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